Secrets of the Superfund site

Documents recently “re-discovered” at the Montana Department of Environmental Quality in Helena not only provide a revealing look at the scope of the oil pollution in the Whitefish River before effective action was taken at the BNSF Railway facility — they also pinpoint a potential pollution source that DEQ officials currently overseeing the Superfund site were not aware existed.

Residents and property owners in the city’s Railroad District and city officials learned about the “newfound” documents when they met with DEQ environmental science specialist Matthew Kent on Oct. 19. The BNSF facility is listed high on Montana’s priority list for state Superfund sites.

Kent, who oversees the Superfund site, told the Pilot a file containing 38 pages of letters and memos and three maps created in 1972-1974 was originally held by the Water Quality Bureau, a state agency that predated DEQ. The file got misplaced when the bureau became a part of the larger state agency, he said.

A century of railroading in Whitefish left large underground plumes of diesel fuel in at least three locations — at the BNSF Railway locomotive refueling station, just east of the red roundhouse building, and at two former passenger train refueling, sites east and west of the historic depot building.

The Great Northern Railway originally built the railyard as a division point in 1903-1904. The company switched from Bunker C fuel to diesel in the 1930s, and locomotive maintenance and repairs took place at Whitefish from 1904 through 1958, when major repair work was transferred to other sites. The passenger train refueling sites were closed in the 1980s.

As much as 110,000 gallons of diesel fuel is believed to be present underground between the locomotive refueling facility and the Whitefish River, with a lobe extending underground toward the Railroad District. The documents in the “missing” file describe events leading to the railroad company’s construction of a 300-foot long interceptor trench along the river in 1973 to prevent further contamination of the river.

———

David Nunnalee, a public health engineer with the Montana Department of Health, notified Burlington Northern division superintendent J.G. Heimsjo, in Spokane, Wash., of the situation in Whitefish in a March 20, 1972, letter.

A floating boom in the Whitefish River was being used to catch oil that “is continuously seeping from the river bank as a result of ground saturation in years past,” Nunnalee said. Railroad workers periodically removed the oil from behind the boom by hand.

Nunnalee was concerned because the “concentrations of black oil may exceed one inch in depth at the downstream end of the boom” and “strong winds occasionally distort the oil boom and cause all of the contaminated oil to pass downstream.” Furthermore, “ducks occasionally sit on the boom, sinking it and passing the oil.”

The oil was also proving lethal to wildlife, Nunnalee continued, citing a local resident who brought a duck and a muskrat to the health department offices. “Both were thoroughly soaked in oil, the duck being dead and the muskrat blind and dying,” he said.

Nunnalee told Heimsjo that the boom was not the answer “as the oil accrues too rapidly.” He called for continuous oil removal by some type of belt-skimming device floating on the river’s surface.

Heimsjo also received a letter from Fletcher Newby, the executive director of the state’s Environmental Quality Council, on April 3, 1972. Newby said he’d received numerous complaints from citizens and state agencies about the oil seepage in the river — including from the Montana Fish and Game Department.

In an April 19, 1972, letter to W.W. Wiklund, at Burlington Northern’s Spokane offices, Nunnalee described seeing railroad workers using absorbent pads to soak up oil seeping out of the river bank. Noting that a “light slick” could be seen on the river for a “considerable distance downstream,” Nunnalee restated the need for a different solution.

“The amount of oil which seeps from the bank over long periods of time seems almost incredible,” Nunnalee said. “There has been some conjecture in this office that there might be a ruptured oil line nearby which is recharging the ground with oil.”

Don Willems, chief of the state’s Water Quality Bureau, supported Nunnalee’s conclusion in a July 20, 1972, letter to B.G. Anderson, Burlington Northern’s assistant vice president of engineering. A copy of this letter and others went to Dr. Bruce McIntyre, the Flathead County Health Officer.

The oil boom floating on the Whitefish River “should not be considered a permanent means of correction as the oil should be intercepted before it reaches the river,” Willems said. “Also, the source of this oil should be determined and eliminated.”

———

The company was well aware of problems at the floating boom, where oil originated from a site called “Area B.” But according to an Aug. 24, 1972, memo by M.J. Nelson, a Burlington Northern structure engineer, the company knew of other areas of concern at the Whitefish railyard.

A 50-by-150-foot site called “Area A” — which the DEQ recently learned about from the “lost” documents — was a dump located west of the roundhouse. Nelson said the site consisted of “a large pile of oil-saturated journal pads, used oil filters, scrap treated timber and other debris.” He noted that “the ground at this location has also become saturated with oil.”

Another site of concern was an old wastewater lagoon located right along the river near the floating boom. The former lagoon had been filled with clean material in 1970, but runoff from the area had a visible sheen. Nelson explained in the memo that a 14-by-304-foot metal drip pan at the locomotive fueling station that collected spilled oil formerly drained to the filled-in lagoon.

While inspecting the facility, Nelson watched a railroad worker re-fuel four locomotives by himself when the hoses failed to automatically shut off. Nelson estimated 10 to 15 gallons spilled onto the drip pan.

“We were informed that this is a fairly regular occurrence, and the hoses all dripped some when disconnected from engines,” he said.

Fuel that spilled onto the drip pan was collected in a 16-inch sump which held about 920 gallons. Based on their observations that August, Nelson and co-worker Vern Kettleson estimated 153 gallons of fuel was spilled each day — or about 55,845 gallons per year. Their estimate might be low, Nelson noted, because once oil reached the 15-inch mark in the sump, it could flow right on out of the sump.

“It is not known how much oil may have flowed through the sump during this time,” Nelson wrote.

———

Burlington Northern began to take steps to control the oil seeps at the floating boom by digging test pits around Area B. Nelson reported in his Aug. 24 memo that oil was found in a 2-inch thick underground layer of sand, where it was moving horizontally. A 14-foot deep test pit revealed a broken 8-inch tile line connected to a former power house. The hole soon filled with water and oil to the seven foot mark.

Wilbur Aikin, a public health engineer for the state, reported on Sept. 27, 1972, that workers digging trenches to investigate the oil seepage had discovered a very deep manhole connected to the old power house. As the hole kept filling with water and oil, and workers pumped the mixture to a lagoon, it became apparent that seepage at the river bank was reduced.

This was good news for the railroad. On March 30, 1973, C.F. Intlekofer, an engineering manager with Burlington Northern, wrote to Nunnalee about how pumping out the test holes reduced seepage at the river bank. He cited as evidence the opinion of Roger Maddux, who worked at the Whitefish railyard for 30 years.

Intlekofer suggested the railroad continue to pump out the test pits for a year and keep track of the oil seepage along the river bank. If the problem remained, then a “seepage barrier” could be constructed along the river bank.

Burlington Northern was not alone in Montana with its spilled oil problem. In a letter to Willems on May 9, 1973, Intlekofer referred to communication with Art Greathouse at the Humble Oil Co. refinery in Billings, which had a “pollution problem” that was “almost identical to ours.” Intlekofer sent Willems copies of a drawing of a “seepage barrier” that could be installed along the Whitefish River.

State health officers worked with Burlington Northern in its efforts to build a barrier to oil seeping into the river. But in a May 18, 1973, memo to Aikin, Willems noted the company’s surprise by the scope of the pollution problem.

“Up until now, I gather that (Burlington Northern management in) Seattle had trouble believing they could lose 200-300 gallons per day with all the fail-safe equipment,” Willems said.

By fall 1973, construction of the interceptor trench was underway when the railroad discovered something unusual. Intlekofer wrote to Willems on Nov. 27, 1973, about the company’s decision to discontinue use of a 450,000 gallon diesel fuel tank that was located near the lagoon.

Once the fuel tank was emptied, workers discovered “there seemed to be no seepage of oil at the riverbank.” Intlekofer said that “confirms our thinking that diesel fuel, leaking from the large storage tank, diluted the heavy black oil in the ground and carried it to the riverbank.”

The fuel tank was just one more piece of a much larger problem at the railyard.